When a California substitute teacher had her teaching opportunities revoked, she sought justice and the ability to continue to work in the school district. When the court allowed the school district’s decision to lay off the teacher, she took her case to the California Court of Appeal.
A school district employer decided not to rehire temporary high school teacher, Gloria Henderson, after she had worked for the same school district for more than two years. When Henderson decided to take legal action to get her job back, the trial court decided to sustain the school district and its board ‘s decision of sustaining the layoff.
Henderson later demonstrated in appellate court that she should have been given first priority under Education Code section 44918, she has a private right of action under that section; and discrimination claim is not barred by res judicata (the rule that once a cause of action has been litigated, it may not be re-litigated). California Education Code section 44918 states that any employee classified as a substitute or temporary employee, who serves during one school year for at least 75% of the number of days the regular schools of the district were maintained in that school year and has performed the duties normally required, shall have the opportunity to be reemployed for the following school year to fill any vacant positions unless the employee has been released pursuant to subdivision.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, due to Education Code section 44918 and California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) violations. The court found that because Henderson demonstrated that she qualified for first priority, the trial court’s decision counters the Education Code’s near slavish adherence to seniority as a basis for establishing job security among teachers and that subdivision of section 44918 gives rise to a private right of action by a temporary teacher who has served at least 75 percent of two consecutive years in that capacity for the same school district.
The court also held that because Henderson’s discrimination claim was based on her distinct primary right to be free from such discrimination—a right which was not adjudicated in the earlier administrative proceeding—that claim is not barred by res judicata